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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah c< >• i :: I I: t \ pj: u .J i ] s ; 1 i t • ji 1 i i sd. I < : t. i if t: .h i s 
appeal under IJ.C.A, §§78-2a-3 (2) (I) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure Thi s appeal is from the Judgment 
and Order er l ter ed :: i I 1 ic> \ e iiiiil::: e i : 1 0 1 1 99 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether Mrs. Yeaman should have been awarded all of 
the sale proceeds from the SIIU m i i i m t 11 «n 1 i tt. nii-mi t , 
Applicable Standard of Review: The division of marital 
prope i t: .} i , matter of equity and the trial court7s decision 
will be reviewed to determine i\ Uio trial cant I. .iluiwed ili< 
discretion. Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). 
II. Whethei 1 1 i Ye .< i,i " tc .i i should have been awarded all 
of the marital property. 
Applicable Standard of Review: The division of marital 
]JI u p * mi i \ in mi nil I I M I i if i'quit ) L's decision 
will be reviewed to determine if • r.* "i rm ^ourt abused its 
discretion. Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). 
Yeaman's Motion to Alter or Amend Findings of Factf Conclusions 
of a-"•••! Judgment and Order or , ii i the Alternative, Motion for 
« . 
Applicable Standard of Review: Said motion was filed 
i lovember 21, 1994 *? court's denial of a 
1 
trial court abused its discretion by acting unreasonably. 
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1988). 
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The duty of the court to divide property, debts and 
obligations equitably: 
U.C.A. §30-3-5(1) (1994): 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the 
court may include in it equitable orders relating to 
the children, property, debts or obligations and 
parties. 
Mr. Yeaman's right to a new trial: 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
[A] new trial may be granted to all or any of the 
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a 
motion for a new trial in an action tried without a 
jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered . . . amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct 
the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court 
. . .or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion 
by which either party was prevented from having a fair 
trial. 
(3) Accident or surprise which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the 
party making the application, which he could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at 
the trial. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision or order that is against the 
law. 
(7) Error in law. 
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Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days 
after entry of judgment the court may amend its 
findings or make additional findings and may amend the 
judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a 
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. and Mrs. Yeaman were married on May 12, 1991. On 
February 2, 1993 Mr. Yeaman filed a Verified Complaint for 
Divorce. (R. 002). 
At the Pre-Trial Conference on November 22, 1993 the 
parties stipulated that this matter should be bifurcated; that 
defendant, Ms. Yeaman, should be awarded the divorce; that Mr. 
Yeaman7s attorney should be allowed to withdraw and that all 
other issues should be reserved for further hearing. (R. 037). 
Accordingly, a Decree of Divorce pursuant to the above 
stipulation was entered on December 7, 1993. (R. 048). 
On March 8, 1994 the parties stipulated that the 
marital residence located at 10290 South 1280 East, Sandy, Utah 
could be sold consistent with the terms of an earnest money 
agreement with the Bells. It was also agreed that $5,000.00 of 
the proceeds would be distributed to Ms. Yeaman and the remainder 
would be held in escrow. (R. 065) . 
The trial of the remaining issues was held on September 
9, 1994 in the Third Judicial District Court the Honorable Boyd 
Bunnell presiding. (R. 094). Judge Bunnell filed his Memorandum 
Decision on September 20, 1994 and the Findings of Fact and 
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Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order regarding the trial 
were entered on November 10, 1994 (R. 098-103 and 109-119). 
On November 21, 1994 Mr. Yeaman filed a Motion to Alter 
or Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and 
Judgment, or, in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial. (R. 122-
136). Said motion was denied on February 3, 1995. (R. 172-176). 
The Notice of Appeal herein was filed on March 2, 1995. (R. 
177) . 
The following facts are divided into numbered 
paragraphs to make reference thereto more convenient: 
1. The parties herein were married on May 12, 1991. 
(R. 275). 
2. On October 23, 1991 the parties purchased a 
residence located at 10290 South 1280 East, Sandy, Utah. (R. 
251) . 
3. Title to said marital residence was in the name of 
Ms. Yeaman who immediately thereafter, on the same day, conveyed 
the property to herself and Mr. Yeaman. (R. 251 and 269-270). 
4. On September 24, 1993 Mr. Yeaman signed a Quit 
Claim Deed regarding the marital residence wherein Mrs. Yeaman 
was the grantee. (R. 208). 
5. The Court found that Mr. Yeaman signed the deed 
freely and voluntarily contrary to the testimony of Mr. Yeaman. 
(R. 112 and 208). 
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6. A Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter on 
December 7, 1993, but the issues regarding the division of the 
property were reserved for a subsequent trial. (R. 049). 
7. The marital residence was sold on March 9, 1994 and 
the net sale proceeds of $28,712.37 were held in escrow pending 
an order of distribution from this Court. (R. 065 and 110). 
8. Other assets which were divided by the Court are as 
follows: 
Assets Value 
a. Miscellaneous personal property $20,000 
(including household appliances, 
furniture, furnishings and bank 
accounts) (R. 202, 253 and 256) 
b. 1989 Mercur Scorpio (R. 257) 2,000 
c. Wife's American Express Retirement 
Account (R. 188-191) 
d. Interest in Kinetico and Power figment of 
Play tools (R. 199) Husband's 
imagination 
9. The debts and obligations which were divided by the 
Court are as follows: 
a. Debt regarding 1989 Mercur Scorpio 
(R. 257) 
b. Debt to Craig Wardle (R. 210) $445.00 
c. Optima Card (R. 210) 2,223.00 
d. Wife's 1993 taxes (R. 249) 1,996.92 
e. Wife's 1992 taxes (R. 247) 2,448.00 
f. State of Utah (R. 114) 259.06 
g. David Patterson (R. 114) 81.75 
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10. On Ms. Yeaman's Financial Declaration she claimed 
that household furniture, furnishings and appliances had a value 
of $30,000.00. There was no indication thereon that she claimed 
that part of it was owned by her prior to the marriage of the 
parties. (R. 030-036) 
11. During the pretrial conferences and other 
discussions Ms. Yeaman never indicated that some of the household 
furniture, furnishings and appliances had been stolen. (R. 146-
147) . At the trial Ms. Yeaman claimed that the value of the 
stolen household furniture, furnishings and appliances was 
approximately $10,000.00. (R. 193). 
12. A copy of the police report which Ms. Yeaman filed 
was provided to the trial court in which she claims that the 
value of the stolen property is $3,000.00. (R. 141-145 and 
Addendum D). 
13. The following are Ms. Yeaman's response to certain 
requests for the production of documents which were submitted to 
Ms. Yeaman on May 6, 1994: 
REQUEST NO. 1: All evidence, including, but not 
limited to, documents which defendant intends to or 
believes may be introduced as an exhibit at the trial 
of this action or which defendant intends to use in 
examining or cross-examining witnesses. 
RESPONSE: Defendant objects to Request No. 1. 
Defendant will exchange trial exhibits with the 
plaintiff consistent with the terms of the pretrial 
order. 
REQUEST NO. 2: All exhibits which defendant 
intends to attempt to introduce at the time of trial of 
the above-captioned matter. 
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RESPONSE: Defendant objects to Request No. 2. 
See response to Request No. 2. 
REQUEST NO. 9: All documents and accounting 
records for the period of time from January 1, 1991 to 
the present regarding any property which defendant 
claims she owned prior to her marriage to plaintiff. 
RESPONSE; No documents exist. 
REQUEST NO. 10; All documents and accounting 
records regarding any property which defendant claims 
is her separate property. 
RESPONSE: No documents exist. 
REQUEST NO. 14: All documents and accounting 
records regarding the purchase of the various items of 
furniture, appliances, stereo equipment, televisions 
and kitchen utensils, silverware and dishes which 
defendant claims should be awarded to her in this 
matter or which are in defendants control or 
possession. 
RESPONSE: Defendant lacks any documents 
contemplated in Request No. 14. 
(R. 126-127). 
14. The following instructions accompanied the above-
described requests for production of documents: 
3. "Document" as used herein, shall mean the 
original and all non-identical copies (whether 
different from the original because of any alterations, 
notes, comments, or other material contained therein or 
attached thereto or otherwise) and drafts of all 
written, printed, recorded or graphic matter of every 
kind and description, together with any attachment 
thereto or enclosure therewith in any way relating or 
referring to or concerning the subject matter of the 
request, whether inscribed by hand or mechanical, 
electronic, micro-film, photographic, or by other 
means, as well as phonic or visual reproductions, and 
shall include, but is not limited to; diaries, notes, 
memoranda, interoffice and intraoffice memoranda, 
memoranda for file, memoranda of telephone 
7 
conversations, memoranda of meetings and conferences, 
drafts, calculations, contracts, agreements, reports, 
compilations, schedules, tabulations, tallies, charts, 
tables, diagrams, drawings, minutes, minutes of 
meetings, circulares, pamphlets, correspondence, plans, 
specifications, vouchers, statements, letters, 
invoices, ledgers, records, orders, checks, receipts 
and bills, computer-stored data or data bases and 
computer printouts, or any document such as a code for 
a computer run or printout and any other retrievable 
data in your possession, custody or control or known to 
you, wherever located. 4. "Accounting records" as 
used herein shall mean all documents and files of an 
accounting nature, including by way of example and not 
limitation: audits, invoices, receipts, bills of sale, 
purchase orders, time sheets, notes, drafts, checks, 
journals, ledgers, summaries, expense vouchers, bank 
statements, canceled checks, deposit slips, periodic or 
special reports, reviews, reconciliations, budgets, 
reports and analyses and plaintiff's documents and 
accounting records. 
. . . . 
5. Defendant's answer to each request for 
documents and things shall include such documents 
relating to such answer as are within defendant's 
custody, possession or control, including but not 
limited to, all documents in the custody, control or 
possession of defendant's accountants, consultants, 
attorneys or other agents. 
6. Each of these requests is and shall be deemed 
to be continuing. In the event at any later date 
defendant obtains or becomes aware of any additional 
documents not included with defendant's answers hereto, 
defendant shall promptly notify plaintiff through his 
counsel and amend defendant's answers to said request 
accordingly to apprise plaintiff's counsel of such 
additional documents in accordance with Rule 26(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(R. 127-128). 
15. At the time of trial Ms. Yeaman introduced 
documents which pertained to a Key Bank Account which she claimed 
showed a deposit from a credit union account which she had 
maintained prior to the marriage. Said documents had not been 
produced to Mr. Yeaman or his attorney until two days before the 
trial. (R. 138-139 and 147). 
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16. At the trial on September 9, 1994 Mrs. Yeaman was 
awarded the following assets: 
Assets Value 
a. Sale proceeds from residence $28,712.37 
b. Miscellaneous personal property $20,000.00 
(including household appliances, 
furniture, furnishings and bank 
accounts) 
c. 1989 Mercur Scorpio 2,000.00 
d. Ms. Yeaman7s American Express 
Retirement Account 
(R. 113, and 117-118 and Addendum A). 
17. Mr. Yeaman was awarded the following assets: 
Asset Value 
Interest in Kinetico and Power figment of his 
Play tools imagination 
(R. 113 and 118). 
18. Mrs. Yeaman was required to pay the following 
obligations: 
a. Debt regarding 1989 Mercur Scorpio 
b. Optima Card 2,223.00 
c. Her 1993 taxes 1,996.92 
d. Her 1992 taxes 2,448.00 
(R. 112 and 118). 
19. Mr. Yeaman was required to pay the following 
obligations: 
a. Debt to Craig Wardle $445.00 
b. State of Utah 259.06 
c. David Patterson 81.75 
9 
(R. 113 and 118). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court made an error of law in ruling that 
because of a deed which was executed by Mr. Yeaman to Mrs. Yeaman 
regarding the sale of the marital residence the proceeds from the 
sale of the residence should be awarded to Ms. Yeaman. The deed 
is irrelevant to an equitable division of the marital assets. 
Furthermore, the trial court did not state any other reason for 
awarding said proceeds to Ms. Yeaman and abused its discretion in 
awarding all of the sale proceeds, the main asset of the 
marriage, to Ms. Yeaman. 
The trial court appeared to base its award of 
essentially all of the remaining assets to Ms. Yeaman upon its 
perception that Mr. Yeaman did not work during the marriage. It 
is an error of law to base the award upon said perception and it 
is an abuse of discretion to award essentially all of the marital 
property to Ms. Yeaman. The trial court did not refer to any 
other criteria as the basis for its award. 
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Yeaman's motion to 
amend or alter or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Ms. 
Yeaman introduced new evidence that some of the property had been 
stolen and the value thereof. Said evidence was contradicted by 
the police report which she filed and which was discovered as a 
result of her claim that some property had been stolen. 
Furthermore, Ms. Yeaman introduced new evidence at the time of 
trial which she refused to produce in response to discovery 
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requests by Mr. Yeaman. As a result Mr. Yeaman was prejudiced 
and the trial court made the errors described above. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Mr. Yeaman Should be Awarded an Equitable Share of 
the Proceeds From the Sale of the Marital Residence. 
On page 3 of its Memorandum Decision the Court stated: 
[T]he Plaintiff voluntarily executed the deed creating 
a valid and legal conveyance whose presumption of 
legality can only be overcome by clear and convincing 
evidence. The Plaintiff has presented no evidence to 
defeat the legal consequence of a document that he 
admittedly, freely and voluntarily signed. 
The above-described deed should not have any effect on the 
division of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that marital property 
"encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the 
parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived . . . 
.
M
 Enqlert v. Enqlert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978). In 
Jefferies v. Jefferies. 895 P.2d 835, 837 (Utah App. 1995) the 
Utah Court of Appeals stated that "First, all assets acquired by 
the parties during marriage are to be considered by the trial 
court when making an equitable distribution, unless the law 
specifically prevents the court from considering a particular 
asset." The residence of the parties was clearly a marital asset 
and should have been equitably divided by the trial court. 
The residence was purchased during the marriage (R. 203 
and 251) and was sold on March 25, 1994. (R. 251). The purchase 
price was negotiated by Mr. Yeaman. (R. 204) . The deed from the 
seller was to Ms. Yeaman and the same day that the conveyance was 
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made to her she conveyed the home to herself and Mr. Yeaman. (R. 
231 and 270-271). The loan to purchase the home was obtained in 
the name of Ms. Yeaman because of negative credit of Mr. Yeaman. 
(R. 257). 
Ms. Yeaman testified that she obtained a loan against 
her retirement for the down payment. (R. 236). The amount of 
the down payment was claimed to be $6,368.00 which differed from 
her prior claim that the amount of the down payment was 
$9,000.00. (R. 237-238). Ms. Yeaman testified that she made all 
the house payments and that all house payments were made from her 
wages. (R. 262). The down payment loan was repaid by payroll 
deductions. (R. 265-266). During the course of the trial Ms. 
Yeaman's testimony changed from claiming that she had about 
$1,000.00 in savings at the time of the marriage to she had about 
$8,000.00 in savings at the time of the marriage. (R. 263-264 
and 272-273 and 275). No explanation was given as to why the 
down payment was borrowed if she had the amount in savings that 
she claimed to have. 
The evidence was disputed as to whether Mr. Yeaman made 
any repairs or performed any maintenance to the residence during 
the course of the marriage. Mr. Yeaman testified that put up the 
drywall in one room, replaced doors, painted the downstairs and 
ceiling, wallpapered the hallways, two bathrooms, kids7 room and 
downstairs and fixed the pool pumps, Jacuzzi and sprinkler 
system. (R. 208). Ms. Yeaman denies that he did anything. (R. 
274) . 
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The circumstances surrounding the execution of a quit 
claim deed by Mr. Yeaman regarding the marital residence are 
disputed. However, said deed is irrelevant to the division of 
the sale proceeds in a divorce proceeding. Mr. Yeaman testified 
that he signed the deed in order that Ms. Yeaman would no longer 
harass him by sitting outside of his place of residence and 
making numerous calls to him and his friends. (R. 278). He did 
not think that he was giving up his interest in the property and 
was so advised by an attorney. (R. 209). He also testified that 
he did not receive any money in regard thereto. (R. 218). 
Ms. Yeaman alleged that Mr. Yeaman approached her and 
said he would execute a deed if she would pay him $500.00. 
According to her, the parties purchased a form deed which she 
completed at the desk of a secretary at the bank and the deed was 
signed at the bank where she withdrew $700.00 and paid it to Mr. 
Yeaman. A bank statement was introduced by Ms. Yeaman which 
showed a withdrawal of $700.00. (R. 230). 
Ms. Yeaman testified that she paid her companion who 
resides with her, Jeff Dillingham, $1,675 to make some repairs 
and do some painting in order to sell the home. (R. 241-242 and 
267). She testified that she obtained a loan of $1,500.00 in 
order to pay him. (R. 242). However, Mr. Dillingham testified 
that he received a deposit of $500.00 and monthly payments of 
$300.00. (R. 286). 
In Jackson v. Jackson. 617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980) the 
plaintiff, prior to the divorce, had a one-fourth interest in a 
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house, title thereto being held by plaintiff, defendant and 
defendant's parents as tenants in common. The Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
The state of title to marital property prior to a 
divorce decree is not necessarily binding on the trial 
court in its distribution of such property pursuant to 
such decree. The trial court is empowered to make such 
distributions as are just and equitable, and may compel 
such conveyances as are necessary to that end. 
Id. at 340-341. 
In Hoaqland v. Hoagland, 852 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah App. 
1993) the court divided equally the proceeds from the sale of 
marital residence purchased during marriage which husband had 
conveyed to wife during marriage and stated: 
Both this court and the Utah Supreme Court have long 
held that once a court has determined that something is 
marital property, the court may distribute it 
equitably, notwithstanding which party's name appears 
on the title. 
See, Hocrue v. Hogue, 831 P. 2d 120 (Utah App. 1992) (Court awarded 
husband an undivided one-half interest in ranch which husband had 
conveyed to wife prior to marriage). 
The above-described deed in the instant case has no 
relevance to the division of the property by the court. If the 
marital residence had been in the name of Mr. Yeaman from the 
date of purchase, the Court would have still had the power to 
divide it equally between the parties. The fact that there is a 
deed from Mr. Yeaman to Ms. Yeaman does not remove the marital 
residence from the marital estate. The status of the title to 
the marital residence is not in any manner binding upon the 
Court. 
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It appears from the trial court's Memorandum Decision 
that the trial court made an error of law. Therein the trial 
court stated: 
[T]he plaintiff voluntarily executed the deed creating 
a valid and legal conveyance whose presumption of 
legality can only be overcome by clear and convincing 
evidence. The Plaintiff has presented no evidence to 
defeat the legal consequence of a document that he 
admittedly, freely and voluntarily signed. 
(R. 100). From this statement it appears that the trial court 
thought that by the deed the residence had been removed from the 
marital estate. As discussed above, according to Utah lawf the 
residence was not removed from the marital estate and should have 
been divided equitably by the trial court. 
Furthermore, there are no circumstances which justify 
departing from the general rule that "marital assets are to be 
divided as equally as possible." Moore and Moore, 829 P.2d 704, 
705 (Or.App. 1992). In Naranao v. Naranao. 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 
(Utah App. 1988) this court set forth some of the circumstances 
which must be considered by the trial court in fashioning an 
equitable property division and stated: 
[T]rial courts must consider all of the pertinent 
circumstances, including the amount and kind of 
property to be divided, the source of the property, the 
parties7 health, the parties' standard of living and 
respective financial conditions, their needs and 
earning capacities, the duration of the marriage, what 
the parties gave up by the marriage, and the 
relationship the property division has with the amount 
of alimony awarded. 
The trial court apparently did not consider any of the above 
factors except perhaps the amount and kind of property to be 
divided. None of the above factors exist which would support the 
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award of the sale proceeds to Ms. Yeaman. The findings herein 
are inadequate for review because they are not "sufficiently 
detailed and [do not] include enough subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue 
was reached." Rucker v. DaIton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). 
In the instant case there are no subsidiary facts but only 
ultimate conclusions. The proceeds from the sale of the marital 
residence should have been divided equally between the parties. 
II. Mr. Yeaman Should have been Awarded an Equitable 
Share of the Miscellaneous Personal Property Including 
the Household Furniture, Furnishings and Appliances. 
On page 4 of its Memorandum Decision the Court stated: 
The Court further awards to the Defendant the balance 
of any personal property now in her possession since 
they were mainly acquired by her efforts without any 
contribution from the Plaintiff. 
As stated above, the general rule is that marital 
assets are to be divided as equally as possible. Moore. 829 P.2d 
at 704. in Hatayama v. Hatavama. 818 P.2d 277, 282 (Hawaii App. 
1991) the court stated: 
Divorce is not a vehicle by which one spouse is 
compensated for having given more than he or she 
received during the marriage or for having had to 
suffer during the marriage from the other spouse's 
inadvertent, negligent, or intentional inadequacies, 
failures, or wrongdoings, financial or otherwise. In 
other words, evidence that the husband or the wife was 
a bad mate . . . provider, income producer, investor, 
manager of money, handyperson . . . or the like, is not 
relevant to the issue of the division and distribution 
of property. If such evidence was relevant, each 
spouse would be well-advised to prepare from the date 
of the marriage for the possibility of a divorce by 
meticulously keeping score in a daily diary. . . . 
Allowing it to be such a vehicle would be contrary to 
the public policy in favor of loving, trusting, 
harmonious marriages . . . . 
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A division of the property based upon who contributed more 
financially to the marriage is not supported by law. 
Furthermore, Mr. Yeaman testified that he did work 
during the marriage. Mr. Yeaman testified that he was employed 
90% of the time during the marriage and that he gave his income 
to Ms. Yeaman who deposited it in her checking account. (R. 206-
207). Mr. Yeaman7s testimony was that he had not filed a tax 
return because he was entitled to a refund not that he hadn't 
made enough to require filing a tax return. (R. 218). The only 
evidence in opposition thereto was Ms. Yeaman's testimony that 
Mr. Yeaman was unemployed except for a couple of months during 
the marriage. (R. 195). 
Mr. Yeaman testified that the property acquired during 
the marriage was a dining room table, bunkbeds, stereo, china 
hutch, pool assets, couches and chairs. (R. 202 and 214). He 
testified that $1,500.00 was paid toward the china hutch prior to 
the marriage and the remaining $300.00 was paid after the 
marriage. (R. 210). Ms. Yeaman had no knowledge regarding the 
payments on the china hutch and testified that $200.00 was paid 
for the china hutch after the parties were married. (R. 255-
256) . Ms. Yeaman did not dispute that the above items were 
purchased during the marriage. (R. 253). On a financial 
declaration submitted by Ms. Yeaman the household items were 
valued at $30,000.00 and no claim was made that any of said the 
items referred to therein were property which she acquired prior 
to the marriage. (R. 30-36). At the trial Ms. Yeaman testified 
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that all of the household furnishings except those stated above 
were hers prior to the marriage. (R. 253). She further claimed 
that the sterling silver, china, crystal, antiques, linen, 
tablecloths and heirlooms had been stolen and that the value of 
said items was $10,000.00. (R. 193-194). 
Ms. Yeaman testified that she was employed by American 
Express for approximately fourteen and a half years of which 
approximately one and a half years were during the marriage and 
that she would receive approximately $12,000.00 as a retirement 
benefit. (R. 188-189). All of said interest was awarded to Ms. 
Yeaman. 
According to the testimony of Ms. Yeaman there was no 
value to Kinetico and Power Play products was a business owned by 
Mr. Yeaman prior to the marriage. (R. 194-195). Mr. Yeaman was 
awarded any interest that he may have in any business enterprise. 
In Naranio v. Naranio. 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988) 
the court listed the pertinent circumstances that trial courts 
must consider in fashioning an equitable property division and 
none of the factors was the amount of financial contribution 
during the marriage. The Utah Court of Appeals stated as 
follows: 
Trial courts xneed be guided by the general purpose to 
be achieved by a property division, which is to 
allocate the property in a manner which best serves the 
needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue 
their separate lives.' (citations omitted). 
Id. at 1148. The division of property in the instant case does 
neither of the above and was not equitable. Essentially all of 
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the property herein, real and personal, was awarded to Ms. Yeaitian 
which is an abuse of discretion and defendant should be awarded 
an equal share of the personal property. 
III. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Mr. Yeaitian7s 
Motion to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment and Order or. in the Alternative. 
Motion for a New Trial. 
During discovery Mr. Yeaman requested documents from 
Ms. Yeaman which were in her possession, custody or control or 
her agents. Said documents include the bank statements which Ms. 
Yeaman used at trial to support her claimed contributions to the 
marriage, the source of her contributions and her claim that Mr. 
Yeaman did not financially contribute to the marriage. (R. 126-
127). Ms. Yeaman did not produce any records regarding a credit 
union account which would have allowed Mr. Yeaman to verify the 
claims which wife made at trial regarding Mr. Yeaman's 
contributions and her contributions. (R. 126-127 and 138-139). 
Ms. Yeaman also failed to produce records regarding her 
pension plan which could have been used as described above. 
Ms. Yeaman's disclosure at trial that items of personal 
property had been stolen allowed her to increase the value of the 
items stolen and thus decrease the value of the items in her 
possession. As can be seen from the police report regarding the 
stolen items, there is a large discrepancy between the report and 
Ms. Yeaman7s testimony at the trial that the value of said items 
is approximately $10,000.00. (R. 141-145). Furthermore, it is 
unknown whether Ms. Yeaman was reimbursed for said items from 
insurance. 
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Because of Ms. Yeaman7s tactics she has been able to 
make it appear as though Mr. Yeaman should not be believed when 
in fact it is Ms. Yeaman who should not be believed. It is 
unknown why the trial court awarded substantially all of the 
property to Ms. Yeaman, but the trial court may have been 
prejudiced by her tactics. Accordingly, Mr. Yeaman should have 
been awarded a new trial to present the evidence which was not 
discovered because of Ms. Yeaman7s tactics. 
Finally, because of Ms. Yeaman's failure to produce the 
documents requested, it is unknown what the balance of the Key 
Bank account and the credit union account was at the time of 
divorce. 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that: 
[A] new trial may be granted to all or any of the 
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a 
motion for a new trial in an action tried without a 
jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered . . . amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct 
the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court 
. . . or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion 
by which either party was prevented from having a fair 
trial. 
. . . . 
(3) Accident or surprise which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the 
party making the application, which he could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at 
the trial. 
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(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision or order that is against the 
law. 
(7) Error in law. 
Pursuant to the above provisions Mr. Yeaman should have been 
granted a new trial or the existing ruling of the trial court 
should have been modified. It is an abuse of discretion to award 
essentially all of the property of the parties to Ms. Yeaman and 
then fail to allow Mr. Yeaman an opportunity to refute the 
surprise testimony with the newly discovered evidence, all of 
which was the result of the attempt by Ms. Yeaman to hide 
relevant information from Mr. Yeaman. Ms. Yeaman should be held 
accountable to Mr. Yeaman for the dissipation of marital assets 
if in fact any items have been stolen. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 
895 P.2d 835 (Utah App. 1995). 
CONCLUSION 
Title to the marital residence should have no effect on 
the division of the proceeds from the sale thereof. The property 
should have been divided equally since there are no factors which 
would support an unequal division. The income of Mr. Yeaman 
during the marriage is irrelevant to the division of the property 
between the parties. Finally, Mr. Yeaman was prejudiced by Ms. 
Yeaman's failure to produce documents which were requested during 
discovery and, accordingly, Mr. Yeaman should be awarded an 
opportunity to present evidence to rebut the testimony of Ms. 
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Yeaman at the trial and to demonstrate that Ms. Yeaman has not 
been candid with the Court. 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of October, 1995, 
DAVID J. HODGSON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing 
to Jayne DeMarco,
 c/o Louise DeMarco, 312 Walton Street, West 
Hampstead, N.Y. ^1552 this day of October, 1995. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Judgment and Order 
and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
William W. Dowries, Jr . (#0907) 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Defendant 
FILESBfa*rt!!2Tiw- ..' 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 1 0 1994 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES T. YEAMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAYNE YEAMAN, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
3/r?/^3 
Civil No. 934900347 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
This matter came on for trial before the court on 
September 9# 1994 before the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Senior 
Trial Judge. Plaintiff appeared in person and through counsel, 
David J. Hodgson, and defendant appeared in person and through 
counsel, William W. Downes# Jr. The court heretofore entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Based thereon, 
and for good cause appearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Defendant Jayne Yeaman is awarded the net proceeds 
derived from the sale of certain real property located at 10290 
South 1280 East, Sandy, Utah 84094, in the sum of $28,712.37. 
$5,000 of these funds has previously been disbursed to Jayne 
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Yeaman. The balance of these funds is currently held by 
Superior Title Company of Utah# Inc. 
2. Defendant is awarded a 1989 Mercury automobile owned 
by her prior to her marriage to plaintiff. This vehicle is 
awarded to defendant free and clear of any claim of plaintiff 
and defendant is ordered to pay the indebtedness thereon. 
3. Defendant is awarded all personal property currently 
in her possession. Plaintiff is awarded all personal property 
currently in his possession. 
4. Plaintiff and defendant are each awarded any retire-
ment accounts maintained in their respective names. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded any and all interest that may 
have been accumulated in any business enterprises that he was 
or is pursuing. 
6. Defendant is ordered to pay her tax liability owed to 
the United States government and the State of Utah for income 
tax delinquencies for the years 1991 and 1992 as a result of 
her separate income tax filing. 
7. Defendant is ordered to pay the balance owed on the 
Optima card. 
8. Plaintiff is ordered to pay the amount owed to the 
State of Utah in the sum of $259.06 and the amount owed to 
David Patterson in the sum of $81.75. Plaintiff is ordered to 
hold defendant harmless on these sums. 
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9. Each party is ordered to pay their respective attorn-
ey 's fees in this matter. 
10. Defendant is restored her birth name and shall be 
known hereafter as Jayne DeMarco. 
11. Plaintiff and defendant are each restrained from 
having any contact with one another either in person, by 
telephone or in any other manner. Further, plaintiff and 
defendant are each restrained from having any contact with the 
employer of the other. Further, defendant is restrained from 
having any contact with Karen Clouse, a friend of the plain-
tiff. Further, defendant is restrained from speaking to 
plaintiff's children about the plaintiff. 
DATED this ff) day of W'fr)/ ^ , 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
District Court Judge 
David J.; Hodgson 
Attorney for'Plaintiff 
2763\onkr 
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William W. Downes, Jr. (#0907) 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Defendant 
FILED DISTRICT U , ^ ; 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 1 0 1994 
'iirij.> 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES T. YEAMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAYNE YEAMAN, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 934900347 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
Commissioner Michael s. Evans 
The above-captioned matter came on for trial before the 
court on September 9, 1994, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Senior 
Trial Judge, presiding. Plaintiff appeared in person and 
through counsel, David J. Hodgson, and defendant appeared in 
person and through counsel, William W. Downes, Jr. Previously, 
on December 7, 1993, this court granted defendant a decree of 
divorce from plaintiff. Said decree was final upon entry. The 
court reserved all issues pertaining to property division and 
debt allocation for further hearing. The court heard all 
lawful evidence in this matter on September 9, 1994. Based 
thereon, and for good cause appearing, the court hereby makes 
and enters the following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On October 23, 1991, the parties acquired certain 
residential property located at 10290 South 1280 East, Sandy# 
Utah 84070. The property was acquired in the name of Jayne 
Yeaman. 
2. After the parties acquired the property located at 
10290 South 1280 East, Sandy, Utah 84070, Jayne Yeaman quit-
claimed the property to herself and to plaintiff, Charles T. 
Yeaman. 
3. Plaintiff and defendant cohabitated in the residence 
until September, 1992, when they separated. Defendant remained 
in the residence and plaintiff moved elsewhere. 
4. The residence was sold on March 10, 1994. The sale 
of the residence, after payment of all liens and encumbrances, 
yielded net proceeds in the sum of $28,712.37. $5,000 of these 
proceeds were tendered to defendant at the time of sale, and 
the balance of the proceeds have been escrowed by the title 
company, Superior Title Company of Utah, Inc., who closed this 
real estate transaction. 
5. On September 24, 1993, plaintiff executed a quit-
claim deed conveying his interest in the property located at 
10290 South 1280 East, Sandy, Utah to defendant. This deed was 
properly notarized and duly recorded in the office of the Salt 
Lake County Recorder on the 27th day of September, 1993. 
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6. Both parties testified that they went together and 
purchased a quit-claim deed form by mutual agreement and that 
the plaintiff would convey his interest in the home to the 
defendant by the execution of the deed. Defendant testified 
that the plaintiff came to her with an offer to sell his 
interest in the property to her for the payment of certain 
cash. She further testified that they went to the bank with 
the quit-claim deed form where the deed was completed, typed, 
signed and notarized by her banker. She further testified 
that, at the request of the plaintiff, she then withdrew from 
her bank account the sum of $700 in cash and delivered it to 
the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff had requested this amount 
for the conveyance of his interest in the property. 
7. The plaintiff does not deny that he signed the deed 
and that he did so voluntarily, but denies that he received the 
cash. He states that he agreed to sign the deed in return for 
defendant's promise not to harass him any further in the 
future. This is not a case where one of the parties is mis-
taken or does not remember. It is a case where one of the 
parties is not being truthful with the court. The court gives 
greater credence to the testimony of the defendant relative to 
the payment of the cash and the execution of the deed since the 
deed was completed at her bank and a bank officer notarized the 
signatures. 
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8. Plaintiff voluntarily executed the quit-claim deed, 
creating a valid and legal conveyance, whose presumption of 
legality can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. 
The plaintiff has presented no evidence to defeat the legal 
consequence of a document which he admittedly, freely and 
voluntarily signed. 
9. Plaintiff conveyed to defendant all of his interest 
in the property located at 10290 South 1280 East, Sandy, Utah 
84070 when he signed the deed, and all of the proceeds of the 
sale of the home are to be awarded to the defendant. 
10. During the course of the marriage, defendant worked 
continually and paid for nearly all of the family expenses. 
She maintains her own bank account, to which the plaintiff made 
no contribution. Although plaintiff worked for a few months 
while the parties were together, he did not make sufficient 
income to require the filing of income tax returns for the 
years 1991 or 1992. 
11. Defendant acquired an automobile prior to her 
marriage to plaintiff. There is no equity in this vehicle. 
This vehicle should be awarded to defendant free and clear of 
any claim of plaintiff, and defendant should be ordered to pay 
the indebtedness thereon. 
12. Plaintiff pawned a necklace belonging to defendant to 
Craig Wardle. The amount of money still owed on this necklace 
is $445. Defendant should be granted the right to redeem this 
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necklace from Craig Wardle. If the defendant chooses to redeem 
the necklace, she is hereby awarded judgment against plaintiff 
for the sum paid to Craig Wardle. In order to obtain the 
judgment, the defendant must redeem the necklace before the 
final judgment in this case is filed. The application for a 
judgment in the final decree must be accompanied with an 
affidavit of payment and a copy of a receipt from Craig Wardle. 
13. During the marriage of plaintiff and defendant, 
defendant gave plaintiff $1,000 on February 6, 1992 that was in 
the nature of a loan for a business enterprise pursued by 
plaintiff. It is not reasonable that plaintiff be ordered to 
repay this loan, as defendant has not established that the 
efforts of plaintiff were not for the joint benefit of both 
parties. 
14. It is reasonable that defendant be awarded the 
balance of any personal property now in her possession, since 
they were mainly acquired by her efforts without any contribu-
tion from the plaintiff. 
15. Defendant should be awarded any and all interest that 
may have accumulated in her retirement accounts because of her 
employment over the years. Plaintiff should be awarded any and 
all interest he may have in any business enterprise that he was 
or is pursuing. 
16. It is reasonable that defendant pay her tax liabili-
ties owed to the United States government and the State of Utah 
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for income tax delinquencies for the years 1991 and 1992. 
17. Defendant should be ordered to pay the balance owed 
on her Optima card. 
18. It is reasonable that plaintiff pay, and hold defen-
dant harmless on, the amount owed to the State of Utah in the 
sum of $259.06 and the amount owed to David Patterson in the 
sum of $81.75. 
19. It is reasonable that each party pay their own 
attorney's fees. 
20. It is reasonable that defendant be restored her birth 
name of Jayne DeMarco. 
21. It is reasonable that a mutual restraining order 
issue restraining plaintiff and defendant from having any 
contact with one another either in person, by telephone or in 
any other manner. Further, it is reasonable that plaintiff and 
defendant be restrained from having any contact with each 
other's employer. Further, it is reasonable that defendant be 
restrained from having any contact with Karen Clouse, a friend 
of the plaintiff. Further, it is reasonable that defendant be 
restrained from speaking to plaintiff's children about the 
plaintiff. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court 
hereby enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff conveyed his entire interest in certain 
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residential property located at 10290 South 1280 East, Sandy, 
Utah, to defendant for the sum of $700. This real estate 
transaction was entered into by plaintiff and defendant volun-
tarily. Accordingly, it is reasonable that the proceeds from 
the sale of the residence be awarded to defendant. 
2. It is reasonable that defendant be awarded the 
automobile acquired by her before the marriage. 
3. Defendant shall be granted the right to redeem a 
pawned necklace from Craig Wardle. Should defendant elect to 
redeem the necklace prior to the entry of the final judgment in 
this matter, defendant shall be granted a judgment against 
plaintiff in a sum equal to the amount necessary to redeem the 
necklace. In order to obtain the judgment, defendant must 
redeem before the final judgment in this case is filed. The 
application for judgment must be accompanied by an affidavit of 
payment and a copy of the receipt from Craig Wardle. 
4. Both plaintiff and defendant shall be awarded that 
personal property maintained by them in their possession. 
5. Plaintiff and defendant shall each be awarded any 
retirement accounts maintained in their respective names. 
6. Plaintiff shall be awarded any and all interest that 
may have been accumulated in any business enterprise that he 
was or is pursuing. 
7. Defendant shall be ordered to pay her tax liability 
owed to the United States government and the State of Utah for 
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income tax delinquencies for the years 1991 and 1992. 
8. It is reasonable that defendant pay the balance owed 
on the Optima card. 
9. It is reasonable that each party be ordered to pay 
their respective attorney's fees in this matter. 
10. It is reasonable that defendant be restored her birth 
name and be known hereafter as Jayne DeMarco. 
11. A mutual restraining shall issue restraining plain-
tiff and defendant from having any contact with one another 
either in person, by telephone or in any other manner; a mutual 
restraining order shall issue restraining plaintiff and defen-
dant from having any contact with each other's employer; a 
restraining order shall issue restraining defendant from having 
any contact with Karen Clouse, a friend of the plaintiff; and a 
restraining order shall issue restraining defendant from 
speaking to plaintiff's children about the plaintiff. 
DATED this l\) day of Nfl\J * 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
<j^ ^ 
District Court Judge 
David J 
Attorne 
2763\ffcl 
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ADDENDUM B 
Memorandum Decision 
Thud ,^iul P:;;n.t 
SEP 2 ? 1£94 
SALT LAKfyCOUgVY _ 
By ^Slctep^) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES T. YEAMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
JAYNE YEAMAN, S 
Defendant. : 
: MEMORANDUM DECISION 
; Civil No. 934900347 DA 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on 
September 9, 1994. The divorce in this case has been previously 
granted and the only issue left to be determined at this hearing 
was the distribution of property accumulated during the marriage. 
After hearing the evidence and reviewing the exhibits presented by 
the parties the Court took the matter under advisement and rules as 
hereinafter stated. 
The principal area of disagreement between the parties 
involves the status of the home purchased by the parties in October 
of 1991 and which home was sold after the separation of the 
parties. The money from the sale is being held in escrow pending 
this determination. 
On September 24, 1993, long after the separation of the 
parties, the Plaintiff executed a Quit-Claim Deed conveying his 
interest in the property to the Defendant and which deed was duly 
notarized and recorded. 
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Both parties testified that they went together and purchased 
a Quit-Claim Deed Form by mutual agreement and that the Plaintiff 
would convey his interest in the home to the Defendant by the 
execution of the deed. The Defendant testified that the Plaintiff 
came to her with an offer to sell his interest in the property to 
her for the payment of certain cash. She further testified that 
they then went to her bank with the Quit-Claim Deed Form where the 
deed was completed and typed and signed and notarized by her 
banker. She further testified that at the request of the Plaintiff 
she then withdrew from her bank account the sum of seven hundred 
($700.00) dollars in cash and delivered it to the Plaintiff and 
that the Plaintiff had requested this amount for the conveyance of 
his interest in the property. 
The Plaintiff does not deny that he signed the deed and that 
he did so voluntarily but denies that he received the cash. He 
states that he agreed to sign the deed in return for the 
Defendants promise not to harass him any further in the future. 
This is not a case where one of the parties is mistaken or does not 
remember. It is a case where one of the parties is not being 
truthful with the Court. The Court gives greater credence to the 
testimony of the Defendant relative to the payment of the cash and 
the execution of the deed since the deed was completed at her bank 
and a bank officer notarized the signatures. 
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Regardless of this finding however, the Plaintiff voluntarily 
executed the deed creating a valid and legal conveyance whose 
presumption of legality can only be overcome by clear and 
convincing evidence. The Plaintiff has presented no evidence to 
defeat the legal consequence of a document that he admittedly, 
freely and voluntarily signed. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiff conveyed all of 
his interest in the property to the Defendant when he signed the 
deed and that all of the proceeds of the sale of the home are to be 
awarded to the Defendant. 
The Court further finds that during the course of the 
marriage, the Defendant worked continually and paid for nearly all 
of the family expenses and that she maintained her own bank account 
to which the Plaintiff made no contribution. Although the 
Plaintiff worked for a few months while the parties were together, 
he did not make enough to require his filing of income tax returns 
for the years 1991 and 1992. 
The Court therefore awards to the Defendant her automobile 
subject to the outstanding indebtedness owed thereon and in which 
automobile there appears to be no equity. 
The Court finds that the Plaintiff pawned a necklace belonging 
to the Defendant to CRAIG WARDLE upon which there is still owing 
the sum of four hundred ($445.00) forty-five dollars. The Court 
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awards the right of redemption in -the necklace to the Defendant and 
if the Defendant chooses to redeem the necklace she is hereby 
awarded judgment against the Plaintiff for the sum paid to CRAIG 
WARDLE. In order to obtain the judgment the Defendant must redeem 
before the final judgment in this case is filed and must accompany 
the application to include such a judgment in the final Decree with 
a Affidavit of Payment and a copy of a receipt from CRAIG WARDLE. 
The Court further finds that the Defendant gave to the 
Plaintiff the sum of one thousand ($1,000.00) dollars on February 
6, 1992, that was in the nature of a loan for a business enterprise 
being pursued by the Plaintiff. The Court will not order the 
Plaintiff to repay this amount since the Defendant did not 
establish that the efforts of the Plaintiff in the attempted 
business enterprise were not for the joint benefit of both parties. 
The Court further awards to the Defendant the balance of any 
personal property now in her possession since they were mainly 
acquired by her efforts without any contribution from the 
Plaintiff. The Court further awards to the Defendant any and all 
interest that she may have accumulated in her retirement accounts 
because of her employment over the years. 
The Court awards to the Plaintiff any and all interest that 
may have been accumulated in any business enterprises that he was 
or is pursuing. 
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The Court orders that the Defendant assume and pay the tax 
liabilities owed to the United States Government and the State of 
Utah for income tax delinquencies for the years 1991 and 1992 and 
any balance owed on the Optima Card. 
The Court further orders that the Plaintiff pay and hold 
Defendant harmless on the amount owed to the State of Utah in the 
sum of two hundred fifty-nine ($259.06) dollars and six cents, the 
amount owed to DAVID PATTERSON in the sum of eighty one ($81.75) 
dollars and seventy-five cents. 
The Court further orders that each of the parties pay their 
own court costs and attorney's fees. 
The Court further orders that the attorney for the Defendant 
prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree for the 
Court's signature in accordance with this Decision. 
DATED this^lC^ *day of September, 1994. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 20" day of September, 1994, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
David J. Hodgson 
Attorney at Law 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
William W. Downes, Jr. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Attorney at Law 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
VJot • 0 ^ 
Secretary 
In compliance with the American! with Disabilities Act. 
individuals needing special accommodations (inducing 
communicative aids and services) during this pioceecin^ 
should call 1400-992-0172. at least THREE working 
days prior to lie scheduled proceeding. A A r* 4 *> ** 
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ADDENDUM C 
Judge's Bench Ruling 
m n , . FILED DfSI RICT COURT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO&fcT-J 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
CHARLES T. YEAMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAYNE YEAMAN, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON OBJECTION TO 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND DECREE AND FURTHER 
RULING ON THE MOTION TO 
ALTER AND AMEND FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. 934900347 
This case was tried by this Court on September 9, 1994, 
covering the issue of property distribution. The Court took the 
matter under advisement and entered its Memorandum Decision on the 
20th day of September, 1994. Because of some misunderstanding and 
without proper authority, Finding's of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
a Judgment and Order were signed by the Honorable Judge Frank G. 
Noel on November 10, 1994. The Plaintiff had pending at that time 
an Objection to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Judgment that 
was dated October 6, 1994, and that Objection was never ruled upon. 
Plaintiff then filed on November 21, 1994, a Motion to Alter the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment as signed by 
Judge Noel. On December 21, 1994, the Defendant filed her response 
to those objections and the Motion to Alter. 
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This Court then ordered in accordance with Rule 4-504 of the 
Code of Judicial Administration, that the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment signed by Judge Noel be set aside 
and that they would be treated as proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree to which the Plaintiff had filed 
Objections and a Motion to Alter on the grounds and for the reasons 
stated in his Motions and accompanying Memorandum. 
The Court has now received all Motions and pleadings regarding 
the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and 
rules on the same as hereinafter stated. 
Plaintiff first contends that he should be awarded an 
equitable share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital 
residence. All of Plaintiff/s arguments regarding this issue are 
without merit. The home had ceased to be a marital asset when the 
Plaintiff, after the separation of the parties, voluntarily and for 
good consideration conveyed his interest in the property to the 
Defendant. The law is clear that married parties are free to 
convey property between themselves and can certainly do so to 
settle a distribution of assets on separation. 
The Plaintiff further contends that he should have been 
awarded an equitable share of the miscellaneous personal property 
including the household furniture, furnishings and appliances. 
Again the Court is not persuaded by the arguments of the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff attempts to present at this time evidence based 
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entirely upon prior declarations of the Defendant relative to the 
quantity of the property and its value. These declarations were 
contrary to her testimony at trial where she explained those 
discrepancies. The Court has found that the testimony of the 
Defendant at trial is believable and that the parties had very 
little by way of personal property of any value and for the reasons 
stated in the Memorandum Decision the division should be made as 
stated. 
Plaintiff next contends that he was prejudiced by Defendant's 
failure to provide certain documents requested during discovery. 
Ordinarily objections relative to discovery are taken care of by 
Motions to Compel or Motions made during trial to exclude evidence 
or to produce further evidence. 
However, the Court can find no prejudice to the Plaintiff in 
this regard and will not, at this time, reopen the case regarding 
matters that should have been addressed either prior to trial or 
during the trial. 
The Court therefore denies any objections to the proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and the Motion 
made by the Plaintiff for a new trial. 
The Court further declines to grant the Motion for any further 
hearing since a hearing would not provide any additional material 
that is not presently before the Court. 
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This Court has on this day signed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment in accordance with its prior 
Memorandum Decision and this Order and further orders that those 
documents be entered as the final decree of the Court. 
DATED this J^j^aay of Sy?^*^/?si,,/ , 1995. 
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I hereby certify that on the 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
31* day of January, 1995, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE AND FURTHER 
RULING ON THE MOTION TO ALTER AND AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT AND ORDER was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
David J. Hodgson 
Attorney at Law 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
William W. Downes, Jr. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Attorney at Law 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
P.O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
individuals needing special accommodations (inducing 
communicative aids and services) during this proceeding 
should call 1-800-992-0172, at least THREE working 
days ooct to th-« scheduled proceeding. 000176 
ADDENDUM D 
Police Report 
UTU1M100 »CASE* 
"ISSm^M 
e N^s n 
TIME 
REPORT DAT* H l z W •"" l( , ;oo 
REPORT TYPE: 
S Z L INITIAL REPORT | | SUPPLEMENT 
MLDVALE P O L I C E D E P A R T M E N T 
8 0 East Center St. - Mid vale, Utah 8 4 0 4 7 
TEL > £ — 
M1SD. O 
CASE REPORT 
OFFICIAL 
in *• r i j 
CASE STATUS: 
TVE 
UNFOUNDED 
C Z 3 INACTIVE 
1 1 CLEARED BY ARREST 
\ CLEARED EXCEPTIONALLY 
\ y DATE , 
Q (A) Death eforTaaaar 
U) Q (B) PrwMCUttM 
O Q ( O Extradite* 
g O (D) Vkt refuaad te 
Q (E) Juv«ill*N«curt»4r 
Q (N) Nei Applkaele 
i t , MJddU) COMPLAINANT^!(Leat,F)J/* 
ADDRESS: (Stnet, City, StaU, Zip) ^ T ~ ^ d T ^ o 3 H f . ^ ^ O 
LO.I) * L . 
^ 
Or. g<//l1 
DOB.: :
 <=?-$- SA 
HOMI . .lONEi f^ ) 
"tea* 97^-9o8l 
LOCATION OF INCIDENT: (Addraea if dlfTereat tkaa eh«*re) ^ ^ . BUS. PHONE: ( ) _ . 
OfTENSE DESCRIPTION (See Lbr) A/C H. BIAS HATE AFT. LOCATION WEAPON(S) SECURITY TOOLS USED 
HTJ 
°\\y *BUUMHI»^ »A &^$/>j^.f C gg> J ^ ;1bre«»«tC rytc. 31 \ u. TpiVU*iki/ 
< ; — 4 
GANG. 
Y (^N 
A/C CODtS: 
A-ATTEMPTED 
C- COMPLETED 
HATI BUB CODES: 
RACJAL ' 
11. ANTI • WHITE 
12. ANTI- BLACK 
D.ANTI-AM.D4DUN/ 
ALASKAN NATIVE 
14 - ANTI - ASIAN/PAC.ISL. 
U - ANTI - MULTl RACIAL 
» . NONE (NO BIAS) 
» - UNKNOWN 
ITHWCrTT^AT19P*ALQRC, 
31-ANTI-ARAB 
32 •ANTI *H1SPANIC 
33 - ANTI - OTHER ETHNICITY/ 
NATIONAL ORJODJ 
RiLiCJOJB 
31- ANTI- JEWISH 
3-ANTI-CATHOLIC 
3 . ANTI - PROTESTANT 
24- ANTI • ISLAMIC (MOSLEM) 
25 - ANTI • OTHER REUOION 
24. ANTI - MULTl REUOIOUS 
GROUP 
27 - ANTI - ATHEISM / AGNOSTIC 
SEXUAL 
41 . ANTI • MALE HOMOSEXUAL 
42 - ANTI - FEMALE HOMOSEXUAL 
43 • ANTI • HOMOSEXUAL 
44-ANTI- HETEROSEXUAL 
45- ANTI- BISEXUAL 
HATE AFFILIATION CODES: 
01- YOUTH OANO 
02- ADULT OANO 
03 - ANTI • OOVERNMENT 
04. REUOIOUS CULT 
05 • NON-REUOIOUS CULT 
M-SATANIC CULT 
07-TRIBB 
0t-ENVIRONMENTAL 
Of - ANIMAL PROTECTION 
10-LIFE PROTECTION 
9f-OTHER 
LOCATION OF OFFENSE CODES: 
01-AJR/BUS/TRAIN TERMINAL 14 
02 • BANK / SAVINGS A LOAN 15 
03 -BAR /NIGHT CLUB 14 
04 . CHURCH/SYNAGOGUE 17 
05- COMMERCIAL/ OFFICE BLDO. IB 
06 - CONSTRUCTION SITE IP 
07-CONVENIENCE STORE 20 
0« - DEPARTMENT STORE 21 
09 - DRUO STORE / DR*S OFF. / HOSP. 22 
10 - FIELD / WOODS 23 
11-OOVERNMENT/PUBUCBLDa 24 
12-GROCERY/SUPERMARKET 25 
13 • HIGHWAY / ROAD / ALLEY 
HOTEL/MOTEL ETC 
JAIL/PRISON 
-LAKE/WATERWAY 
> LIQUOR STORE 
. PARKING LOT / GARAGE 
. RENTAL / STORAGE FAC. 
RESIDENCE /HOME 
RESTAURANT 
SCHOOL/COLLEGE 
SERVICE / OAS STATION 
SPECIALTY STORE (TV. FUR ETC.) 
OTHER/UNKNOWN 
OFFENDERS) USED: 
(Check as many aa apply) J 
Q A-ALCOHOL ^ y / \ 
Q C-COMPUTER EQUIP. 
Q D-DRUGS 
Q N . NOT APPLICABLE 
TYPE CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: 
(Check Up To T i m ) 
9B-BUYTNO/ C - CULTTV. / MANUF. / PUBLISH. 
8 D.DISTRJBUTWG/SELLING 
E • EXPLOrnNO CHILDREN 
D O - OPERATWO / PROMOTING / ASSIST. 
O P * POSSESSINO / CONCEALING 
Q T - TRANSPORT. / TRANSMIT. / IMPORT. 
kTor BurgUiy Only) 
NUMBER OF / 
(PREMISES ENTERED / 
METHOD 0 F-FORCED 
WEAPON CODES: 
11 • FIREARM (UNKTYPE) 
12-HANDGUN 
13-RIFLE 
14-SHOTGUN 
15-OTHER FIREARM 
20 - KNIFE / CUTTING INST 
30- BLUNT OBJECT 
35-MOTOR VEHICLE 
40 - PERSONAL WEAPON 
50 -POISON 
60-EXPLOSIVES 
a5-FIRE/INCENDIARY 
DEVICE 
70 - DRUGS / NARCOTICS / 
SLEEPING PILLS 
90-OTHER 
95-UNKNOWN ,K 
99-NONE 
NOTE: IF AUTOMATIC 
WEAPON ADD -A" TO 
WEAPON CODE 
PREMISE SECURITY CODE: 
01-ALARM SYSTEM 
02-BARS 
OJ. DEAD BOLTS 
04- INTERIOR LIGHTS 
05-EXTERIOR LIGHTS 
06-CAMERA 
07-DOG 
08 . LD. PROGRAM 
09 -SECURITY FENCE 
10. GUARD 
11-SEC TYPATROL 
89-NON L 
99.OTHER 
TOOLS USED CODE: 
01-PRY DEVICE 
02-CLUB OR HAMMER 
03-GRIPPING DEVICE 
0 4 . SAW 
05-BOLT CUTTERS 
06-ROCK/BRICK 
07- GLASS CUTTER 
OS-SUP DEVICE 
09-CUTTING TORCH 
10-ELECTRONIC EQUIP. 
99-OTHER 
VICTLM # NAMEJLaet, F lpt , Middle) 
rVattO, <J*M kit fcAM*^ 
ADDRESS (Street, City, State, Zip) diL 
I Tli 
,tW//5 
PHONE 0 
TYPE OF VICTIM: (Check OaJy Oae) 
Jl^i-INDIVIDUAL •G-GOVERNMENT DO-OTHER 
QB-BUSINESS Q R - REUOIOUS QU-UNKNOWNJ 
QF-FTNANCIAL Q S - SOCIETY /PUBUC 
ACl 
Ml 
D.OJL 
R-«-s4 
SEX 
QM-MALE 
dM-FEMALE 
QU-UNKNOWN 
RACE: 
d^ .WHTTE QA-ASIAN 
QB-BLACK QU-UNKNOWN 
Ql -DOIAN 
ICTIM ETHNICITY: 
QH.HISPANIC 
fj^-NON-HISPANIC 
QU.UNKNOWN 
RESIDENT STATUS: 
DR.RESIDENT 
Vo*- NONRESIDENT 
QU-UNKNOWN 
VICTIM CONNECTED TO 
OFFENSE NUMBER: 
V 
I 
c 
T 
I 
M 
a _ 3 
0 4 
QOTHER. 
INJURY TYPE: (Check Up To Fire) 
W ^ - N O N E 
QB-BROKEN BONES 
Q I-POSS. INT.INJURIES D T - L O S S O F T E E T H 
D L-SEVERELACERATION O U • UNCONSCIOUSNESS 
D M- MINOR INJURY 
no-MAJOR INJURY 
M/4-
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT / HOMICIDE CIRCUMSTANCES: 
(Check Up To TWe) 
O 01-ARGUMENT Q 0 4 B -
D 02-ASSAULT ON LAW OFFICER D 05-
Q 03-DRUG DEALING D 06. 
D 04-GANGLAND Q 07-
NEC MANSLAUGHTER Q 08-OTHER FELONY INVOLVED 
JUVENILE GANG Q 09 - OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES 
LOVERS'QUARREL D 09C - JUSTIFIABLE 
MERCY KILLING Q 10 • UNKNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES 
TYPE WEAPON / FORCE INVOLVED: 
(Check Up To Throe) e^J 
(Enter A ui Box If Automatic) 
L_J 
rv J>. , , 
I * HI: 
-FIREARM 
(type not slated) 
8 12-HANDOUN V3-RIFLE 
Q M - S H O T O U N 
Q 1 5 - OTHER FIREARM 
Q 2 0 - KNIFE / CUTTINO 
INSTRUMENT 
• 30 -BLUNT OBJECT 
D 3* -MOTOR VEHICLE 
Q 40 . PERSONAL WEAPONS 
Q 50-POISON 
O 60-EXPLOSIVES 
O 65 - FIRE / INCENDIARY 
D 70 - NARCOTICS / DRUOS 
Q*5-ASPHYXIATION 
Q90-OTHER 
D 95 - UNKNOWN 
Q 9 9 - N O N E 
RELATIONSHIP OF VICTIM TO OFFENDER: 
(For multiple offender relationships enter offender numbers) b apaos) 
mmmmmmmm SB-SPOUSE _ _ CH-CHILD 
CS-COMMON-LAW OC - GRANDCHILD 
SPOUSE IL-IN-LAW 
PA-PARENT SP-STEPPARENT 
SB-STBUNO SC-STEPCHILD 
. SS - STEPSTBUNO 
.OF-OTHER FAMILY 
. AQ-ACQUAJNTANCB 
, FR-FRIEND 
, N E -NEIGHBOR 
. BE - BABYSTTTEE (beby) 
. BO - BO Y / GIRL FRIEND 
. CF - CHILD OF •BO' ABOVE 
. HH - HOMOSEXUAL REL 
. X S - E X - S P O U S E 
. EE-EMPLOYEE 
. ER-EMPLOYER 
. OK - OTHERWISE KNOWN 
. ST-STRANGER 
. VO-VICTIM WAS OFFENDER 
. RU-RELATIONSHIP UNKNOWN 
<*ys i 
M&Oto iO H<a. rAof>e<nu£ CL) SywTo lr C O / M Thtac ^p 'Mat W€. Sf*fc* DAU^tr. 
T^i*s Lv 
SIGNATURE 
QdLZXL ES j Ldtw ^rtMi y<a 77/gM. 
p. < N W i n i v n b • n># JAPPKOVED 
PACE L OF 
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CONTINUATION 
C L A S S I F I C A T I O N ^ F I R S T M L J CASE NO 
ERVVTIONS 3 LIST AOOlflONAL VICTIMS. SUSPECTS. INFO. ETC NARRATIVE I SOURCE OF ACTIVITY 2 OBS A  ARREST 4 BOOKING AND ADDITIONAL 
Cj SPm^o S*t /J/5 /.+*r*r~ USr o± s/z^/W Q^ *//z/y/ tl 
Udiv<r ^t> <Jtr ;^go he* USsT. t°J *(J*TV4 # MiWrn AfrJo w<.^Y~ -roJ/lZ 
T?ic LeKAcs> £><*<*> &»<k \A<ic Sn^/»/* S*f*rac C ) "^nmo u)*4e*± S*i£ qor yt> 
^ycht^tut. (JtJ'>r^ yurrr- ! W t^m. AJcfPi*/**} /ft*. Cl^^T H*K> AS/) 6<rdc^ 
UdUij ~~&sertt& U>z>c< T*4*x.4 . S / L/T» Smrrtx) G / 4\*rp Lt*-r~ -^BiCtArUT 
LP\TV taJ/^r q^o \L, S o S | Lirvk ~T~b>6Tt- "N^OOIIS. d / ~THe.^  ob 'nXj^ t g Dotn<^ 
& fa>n /KC" yg/eiM U^ F*o»ir Y)a>s.*t, 'ff/D /ht^iQio jb^o jJi^i-r- 7b £irS~tl 
"YUU OpF>Q> ^ * Lexic'us + Wu/ri*'^^loIt*e (Zfl^fe/^WcNO* C ) / s xJpr Sc<*<f g»* 
/frti. y^yi^ i— U3>»^  / o "&gyrfs . C/ /^ Su*c4. &y* T ^ M A L,ism&. Cf L<)s/f 
r
^r ^- /.<? r 
tret CaOTrtcr~ zO"i?vi 5s/ LiW, S7 ^ ^ ^eg^£) c&//> O^ou^ir 
\J>CJJ^ . Utr- fj JZ^S<^^ O J /JM+J A/tfC^J Cssd£^ S/^rw- ST^RQ 
^WiiA LOfKjc &u*r~ <5P ^ 0 A/D ^^C^>I O>O Httt UtX?'. ^f L*n+ <?#i?c hsrC^t 
^ J "* ^ ^ ^ - ' y ^ • „ - . ! ,^ ^^ ^^ ,5 L n - i r n r tnrM- r —r *f ^4 i/ i / t 
C-j Sp>rf-*r> SH<6 A^»> 8^- ^koj^cs/b^g>o 6 0 ^ ^ / 6 i W lUH*tA~ 
Lcyj-O^ #tTl-*>TKyO ~^ TD ^ | ^ A j ^ W V***" S^g. Re*)T*o W3 l/*Jt V. 
I A^r tfw} 
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CONTINUATION 
— p^— OF. 
CLASSIFICATION COMPLAINANTS t>ai *#-£0^ FlfST 
DBSERv/f 
>Jt 
CASE NO 
9^-/15*7 
LIST ADDITIONAL VICTIMS. SUSPECTS. INFO. ETC. NARRATIVE 1. SOURCE OF ACTIVITY 2. O SERVATIONS 3 ARREST 4 BOOKING AND ADDITIONAL 
T^~? a Um)* tf*o Am ^taicaO &*~ L»C**- r»H^O & 0>)e 
Q*De»tr. ' &I& attoc -r*e*\ tu^ c U ? , wty uSill 
feur' Ad /£hin*«i Svng U)OUL.Q. €Ic> Cutting 
£ *TL,I- " * /u ^ lwv»i - T ^ s vo ^<g**i> ?a*M v?/c -3?T*MS . r1 A-c <r>o<. f o ) * 
J9E^S_ 
"H£X M so /O«fM S^o^i ^ c "g fyA i r . 
A A A A A O 
PROPERTY DETAIL COMPLETE A PROPERTY SEGMENT FOR EACH TYPE OF PROPERTY LOSS IN A CASE 
C A S E * HH- MS7 ±J-
DAT
* tfjijqq 
REPORT TYPE: 
tar 
INITIAL REPORT f~l SUPPLEMENT 
Da 
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION CODE TABLE: 
(Into Number In Cod* Column) 
01 • AIRCRAFT 
02 • ALCOHOL 
03 - AUTOMOBILES 
04-BICYCLES 
03-BUSES 
06- CLOTHES /FURS 
07 • COMPUTER HARDWARE / 
SOFTWARE 
08 • CONSUMABLE GOODS 
09. CREDIT/ DEBIT CARDS 
10 - DRUGS / NARCOTICS 
10A 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
IS 
19 
20 
• QUANTITY DRUG MEASURE 
DRUG / NARCOTIC EQUIP. 
FARM EQUIPMENT 
FIREARMS 
GAMBLING EQUIPMENT 
HEAVY CONSTRUCTION / 
INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT 
HOUSEHOLD GOODS 
JEWELRY / PREC METALS 
LIVESTOCK 
MERCHANDISE 
MONEY 
21 • NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
22 - NONNEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
23 - OFFICE • TYPE EQUIPMENT 
24. OTHER MOTOR VEHICLES 
U • PURSES / HANDBAGS 
26.RADIOS/TVS/VCRS 
27 • RECORDINGS • AUDIO / VISUAL 
21 . RECREATIONAL VEHICLES 
29 - STRUCTURES - SINGLE 
OCCUPANCY DWELLINGS 
STRUCTURES - OTHER DWELLINGS 
STRUCTURES - OTHER COMMERCIAL / BUSINESS 
30-
31-
32 • STRUCTURES - INDUSTRIAL / MANUFACTURING 
33 • STRUCTURES - PUBLIC / COMMUNITY 
34 - STRUCTURES - STORAGE 
35 - STRUCTURES - OTHER 
36 • TOOLS • POWER / HAND 
37-TRUCKS 
3t • VEHICLE PARTS / ACCESSORIES 
39-WATERCRAJT 
77-OTHER 
I f . PENDING INVENTORY 
99-( } 
TYPE PROPERTY 
L O S S / E T C CODE 
QTY. PROPERTY DES< IPTION INCLUDE MAKE, MODEL, SIZE, TYPE. SERIAL *v COLOR, E T C 
7> 
VALUE 
RCVD 
VALUE 
NCIC 
DATE 
ENTRY 
DATE 
REMOVED 
NIC NUMBER 
R 
O 
P 
E 
R 
T 
Y 
to 
Q l . N O N I 
Q2.BURNED 
01 - COUNTERFEITED / 
rORCID 
Q4.DAMACID/ 
DESTROYED 
OS-RECOVERED 
Qt-SUZZD 
)(7.STOLEN 
0 1 . UNKNOWN 
QEVIDENCE (ONLT PiMiy 
lie c c, fcusrm- L**ooL«.*r**«c H*LO*R.S 
it> 
it 
I<P 
ib 
IU 
H. 
L C O Q ^ C Cn>uA- U<VS.£, ZMfeT6acD 
U> WTEtfiCXO 0*2*11 mx- Vl KVSC 
*H*.r 
LfeA>oy QriiAiA. CA^Q^ ^ H ***> 
p 
R 
o 
P 
E 
R 
T 
Y 
TYPE PROPERTY 
L O S S / E T C CODE QTY. 
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION 
INCLUDE MAKE. MODEL. SIZE, TYPE, SERIAL i , COLOR, E T C VALUE 
RCVD 
VALUE 
NCIC 
DATE DATE 
ENTRY REMOVED 
NIC NUMBER 
01-NONE 
D2-BURNED 
0 J - COUNTXRJinTD / 
FORCID 
Q4-DAMAGED/ 
DESTROYED 
Q3-RECOVERED 
Q«-SEIZED 
Q7-STOLEN 
D i - UNKNOWN 
D EVIDENCE (ONUfr+frt, 
Ik Lg^erX C«l*te~£azl 2*1 KT&CLO 
IU &. 
/U 8 
!k 
iu 3 o 
C | U?*£ ' U<**0t .£ . -TO C j t u ^ £^ D> <&*W«t w*t, 
6 * <^f»*** L,»S<*0 -7T>^eiH*t. "iS <^: Stoco 
P 
R 
O 
P 
E 
R 
T 
Y 
TYPE PROPERTY 
L O S S / E T C CODE O/TY. 
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION 
INCLUDE MAKE. MODEL, SIZE, TYPE, SERIAL «, COLOR, E T C VALUE 
RCVD 
VALUE 
NCIC 
DATE 
ENTRY 
DATE 
REMOVED 
NIC NUMBER 
Ql-NONE 
IQl-BURNED 
| a » - COUNTERFEITED / 
FORCED 
Ik I T§PPtt-- "SPCTP t>f=7HcL-£Aie.S ^ 
IU 1 ""gcovi-L pvfc n ^1^gi6S k/s£| 
ffl 
| Q4-DAMAGED/ 
DESTROYED 
OS-RECOVERED 
Q«-SEIZED 
Q 7 . STOLEN 
DI-UNKNOWN 
D EVIDENCE (ONUf P * * « * 
ItoDR) 
IU "Sec>u.-"I>gsfiAJ/g>s 
« , " B ^ OF S*4££.TS 
IU "&>^ OF "Tct^ecS 
ik I 
)L 
"S>o^  0 ^ "Bl.qiOt.crs 
0»*ft *>«S 
, — i o»»e * * *» l 
1 I go* t)P^I**L*d**K> »™y«»'«^ 
to*/e iff 
NOTE: INCLUDE AS MUCH DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ABOUT THE PROPERTY INVOLVED. 
MORE THAN ONE LINE MAY BE USED AS NECESSARY. 
?RTIMGJOfTICER ID • . Q 
>. Hcr&bdti^&rJ Z&TJ 
NCIC ENTRY OPERATOR ID # 
ft 0 ft 1 d 5 
